Since World War II, refugee organizations have faced a recurrent challenge: the manipulation of refugees by warring parties to further their own aims. Some armies in civil wars, facing military defeat, use refugees as assets to establish the international legitimacy of their cause, treat refugee camps as sanctuaries and recruitment pools, and limit access to refugees to ensure that they will not repatriate.
Focusing on the geopolitical security environment surrounding militarized camps and the response of humanitarian agencies, the contributors to this volume examine the ways armed groups manipulate refugees and how and why international actors assist their manipulation. They then offer suggestions for reducing the ability of such groups to use the suffering of refugees to their own advantage.
The contributors examine three cases: Cambodian refugees along the Thai border in the 1970s and 1980s, Afghan refugees in Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s, and Rwandan refugees in Eastern Zaire from 1994-96. They argue that refugee manipulation occurs because warring parties gain resources in their fight for power and other actors--often the host government and regional and major powers--encourage and support it. Manipulation is allowed to occur because the international refugee regime and major states have not identified a consistent approach to stopping it. In the post-Cold War era the United Nations and its members have chosen to treat the issue as a humanitarian problem instead of a security problem.
As the contributors make clear, however, manipulation of refugees has important ramifications for international security, turning some civil wars into larger protracted regional wars. They argue that the geopolitics of refugee manipulation leads to sanguine conclusions about stopping it. Solutions must change the moral, political, and strategic calculations of states that are implicated in the manipulation. As long as the problem is not deemed a security threat, refugee organizations must choose between assistance that prolongs war or walking away from millions who deserve help.
Contributors include Howard Adelman (York University), Frederic Grare (Centre des Sciences Humaines, New Delhi), Margaret McGuinness (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison), Stephen John Stedman (Stanford University), Fred Tanner (Geneva Centre for Security Policy), and Daniel Unger (Northern Illinois University).
Sometimes, we cannot return to innocence no matter how hard we try. Refugee Manipulation is a such a book that allows readers to see things in a different light. The book examines three main refugee crisis. The Cambodian refugees in Thailand, the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the Rwandan refugees in Zaire.
When I was very young, I naively believed that when people didn't help in times of crisis, it was because they lack the information to or perhaps they couldn't. When I got older, in the case of Rwanda, I thought that the UN failed to act because nobody had any vested interest in that country. It is not that simple.
When it came to Cambodia, I thought that it was the expulsion of foreigners and the unawareness of political leaders regarding the seriousness of the situation that led to the disturbing conditions. I thought that the issue of refugees were simple. I was vastly wrong.
Sometimes the UN finds itself in a difficult situation because refugee camps may sometimes be places where warring parties regroup to prolong conflict and rendering aid to the camps pave the way for more unrest. Withdrawing aid on the other hand is not humanitarian. Yet it is not easy to control food and aid distribution. One may distribute food to children and women but who is to stop men from laying hands on them?
The UN may also be a group of countries but it is not above politics. Sometimes refugees are forced to cluster in a certain area, typically near borders so that they can form a buffer against further expansion. Such was the case for Cambodians seeking refuge in Thailand. I already knew parts of it from earlier readings but I had not managed to piece anything together. As I am not a History major and am still doing leisure reading, my knowledge may not be entirely correct but I would attempt to give my little perspective garnered so people may understand why this book is an insightful read.
The Cold War was a difficult era. Simply put it, it was between the capitalist and communist countries.To summarise what I know and recall from all sorts of books and readings over the years, Vietnam, Lao and Cambodia used to be a French colony. The area was called Indochine. However in politics, there are no permanent friends. In fact, as I know more about how politics work, I don't think friends is apt. It is more of the case where there are no permanent allies. Between countries, there is no 'feel-good' factor to maintain relationships, the only consideration is interest.
After the end of World War II, Indochine was eventually granted independence (after much difficulty and fighting). Of course, with any emerging nations, the question of political ideology would be first and foremost. Colonial masters seem to like dividing nations. Somehow or rather, (for simplicity sake) North Vietnam was communist-backed and South Vietnam was capitalist-backed since a communist-dominated region wouldn't be good for America's interest.
The Soviet Union who was supposed to be chummy with China due to certain reasons that I shall not go into here, wasn't any more. China found itself surrounded by no political friends. USSR was on top. On the East side, there was Japan. Not to mention, North and South Korea was probably having a similar problem around that time. Let's leave out countries on the West of China, such as India. Communist Vietnam was chummier with the USSR than China. I knew that from before. It is thus not surprising when I happened to read that China sold weapons to Cambodian refugees so that they could rise up against the Vietnamese.
(I was too lazy to find a better map but Cambodia is right under Lao, between Vietnam and Thailand. Anyway Viet forces were also pushing its way into Lao)
What better than refugee camps to breed dissent? Such was also the case in Rwanda, perhaps more so.
When all was worried about Vietnamese expansion in Southeast Asia, maybe on hindsight now after reading Refugee Manipulation, I shouldn't be so surprised after all that Thailand was willing to have Cambodians as a buffer at the border. After all, it also wouldn't do to have Cambodians feeling safe and comfortable and ending up drawing even more refugees into Thailand. What shocked me was the willingness and participation by many countries to keep refugees in refugees camps at the borders for their political interest through dangling food and aid. "In many cases, the Thai military put pressure on Cambodians to return to the border to join anti-Vietnamese resistance." (pg 44)
Conditions in refugee camps are more often than not, complicated, messy and dismal. Sometimes, Thai guards would even request women from the refugee camps. People often had not enough to eat. Most of the time, even if aid was rendered, they do not reach the needy. And yet, do you render aid, even if you suspect that the bulk of it is siphoned off by unethical middlemen and dealers or even to possible fighters, funding conflict or cut it off completely and have the refugees suffer?
And so when the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees,
UNHCR, found difficulty in balancing relief and that such actions was not in line with its aims and goals, another was eventually set up. Of course, when the question of
possibility funding conflict arises, it would be a sensitive issue for any country (like Thailand or the US) to distribute aid. "The Joint Mission wanted out of its border roles that were provoking authorities in
Phnom Penh, fueling black markets in aid goods along the border and helping combatants, including the Khmer Rouge. Concerned about international perceptions if the Thai military were solely responsible for distributing World Food
Programe (
WFP) food, both Thai and U.S. officials pressed the Joint Mission not to withdraw". (pg 40) Thus the United Nation Border Relief Operation,
UNBRO was eventually set up. However, sometimes, neither the
UNHCR nor the
UNBRO had any access to such camps.
Sometimes it's not easy to render aid and I have more sympathy for the people who are tasked with the responsibility to decide whether their actions would benefit the needy especially since they are so often criticised.
Of course that was merely one case study but I am reluctant to discuss the insights I've garnered from the case study on Rwandan refugees in Zaire other than to say that the UN was slow to act and when it did, perhaps the
Hutus refugees who fled into the camps were the perpetrators of the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda and it eventually affected another country, Zaire. The refugee camps turned into a breeding ground for the continuation of ethnic violence against the Tutsi in Zaire. Discussing this and recalling all my knowledge on the 1994 Rwanda crisis would require another extremely long blog entry. Just thinking about it is already tiring enough.
If anybody knows about the
Afghanistan's-Pakistan refugee issue, that would be the third case study that may interest them. My knowledge on the
Afghanistan and Soviet conflict is the least out of the three. However that is also another interesting issue to delve in. I was told by the father a long time ago that it was due to a need for a port. Of course it would be due to other reasons such as the need for natural resources.
All in all, like what a passage in the book would describe of the turmoil of having to make the right choice and I quote:
The international community was far from eager to aid the Khmer Rouge and might have done son less assiduously if presented an attractive alternative. Even the U.S. government was divided over whether it would be necessary to work with the Khmer Rouge to resist the Vietnamese in Cambodia. American officials were uncomfortable with their vote in the United Nations in 1979, torn between moral principles and international law" that also served U.S. security interests. Should they oppose ASEAN and China, and legitimate Vietnam's invasion?
U.S. Ambassador at Large for Refugee Affairs Victor Palmieri observed that while the United States was "revolted from a humanitarian standpoint" by the Khmer Rouge, it was "revolted from a political standpoint" by Vietnam. (pg 29)
When it comes down to humanitarian versus politics, politics almost always wins. The death of a million is after all just a statistic. Furthermore, the unimaginable is always worse. In politics, isn't it always better to sacrifice a few to curb the horrors that could befall on more?
And so, I was slightly amused when Clinton said that when it comes down to human rights issues, they can achieve more progress with some countries through closed door negotiations. Because a long time ago, I would have believed that. What is the difference between countries that are 'named-and-shamed' and countries you negotiate behind closed doors with? You happen to owe the latter a lot of money. U.S have been walking gingerly recently. That is the loss of innocence for you. You stop believing that countries are strong and mighty. You see more false fronts.
Speaking of which, I was vastly amused to read in the news today that Mr Obama barged in uninvited on a 'secret' meeting between leaders of China, India, South Africa and Brazil. But of course they say that he didn't.
Refugee manipulation is a book for realist. Sometimes altruism is but a political game.
